

(7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Consequently, a complaint asserting diversity jurisdiction must allege citizenship, not residence. *See, e.g., McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp.*, 150 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1998); *Pollution Control Indus. of Am., Inc. v. Van Gundy*, 21 F.3d 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1994). “It is well-settled that ‘[w]hen the parties allege residence but not citizenship, the court must dismiss the suit.’” *Held*, 137 F.3d at 1000 (quoting *Guar. Nat’l Title Co. v. J.E.G. Assoc.*, 101 F.3d 57, 58 (7th Cir. 1996)). Despite this, Byrne’s complaint alleges his state of residence.

Furthermore, “[f]or the purposes of [28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)] . . . , a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated *and* of the State where it has its principal place of business[.]” *Se. Guar. Trust Co., Ltd. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.*, 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1005-1006 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (emphasis added). In the operative complaint, Byrne merely alleges the state of incorporation of Defendant CCC Information Services, Inc.

Accordingly, the Court **ORDERS** Byrne to correct these and *any other* jurisdictional defects **by May 28, 2010**. *See Tylka*, 211 F.3d at 448 (“[I]t is not the court’s obligation to lead counsel through a jurisdictional paint-by-numbers scheme.”). Should he fail to do so, the Court will dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2010

s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE